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human nature in interaction with society and with the world’ (p.  7). 
This duality is, I think, misleading. It is quite intelligible to suggest that 
religion could be both an engagement, by certain receptive persons, with 
a  transcendental reality, where this engagement is affected by human 
biology in social and historical context. The fifth-century Christian 
mystic Denys, for instance, emphasised that religious belief is structured 
by our perceptual, cognitive, and linguistic capacities, as well as by our 
wider social and historical context. Hinde’s claim that either religion 
is what it claims to be – communion with transcendental realities – or 
that it is a  psychosocial phenomenon polarises the discussion. And 
since he has already rejected the transcendental interpretation, the only 
interpretation left is the naturalistic approach, one featuring, amongst 
other things, an ‘evolutionary history of gods’ (p. 65) and, into the future, 
‘a cost/benefit analysis of the impact of Christianity’ (p. 251).
There is much to learn from this book. It provides a useful survey 
of contemporary naturalistic approaches to religious belief and practice 
and the concise length of the chapters, plus the handy summaries, should 
earn it a place on philosophy of religion reading lists. Its scholarly and 
pedagogical utility aside, though, Hinde will not succeed in persuading 
religious persons of the falsity and disutility of their beliefs. Certainly 
one would not be persuaded of his conclusion that ‘ultimately we must 
face the fact that it is up to us, that we cannot hope for help from above’ 
(p. 262). Anyone seeking an introduction to contemporary naturalistic 
theories of religion will find this an excellent resource; however, only 
those already firmly in the naturalistic camp will find it persuasive.
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Theists and atheists continue to debate the cognitive status of religious 
belief. Is theism justified in the light of theories that explain religious 
beliefs as the result of natural cognitive capacities? This question has 
been around at least since William James wrote The Varieties of Religious 
Experience (1902). James believed that religious experiences (especially 
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mystical experiences) were central to explaining religion. using medical 
knowledge available at the time, as well as written sources about mystics, 
James argued that religious experiences are caused by natural medical 
conditions, such as epileptic seizures. Nevertheless, he did not think 
that the psychological origin of religious beliefs debunks these beliefs. 
Today, the cognitive science of religion (Csr) no longer considers 
mystical experience (as caused by exceptional medical conditions) to 
be a central element of religious belief. Csr scholars argue that religion 
rests on mundane cognitive capacities that are present in all neurotypical 
humans, and that arise early and spontaneously in development. Despite 
this shift in how psychologists conceptualize the causes of religious 
belief, the question of whether or not cognitive approaches to religion 
undermine the rationality of religious belief remains alive and well. If 
the religious beliefs we see across cultures are indeed rooted in normal, 
everyday cognitive capacities (which are not specific to religion), does 
this undermine their rationality?
Aku Visala’s Naturalism, Theism and the Cognitive Study of Religion: 
Religion Explained? (henceforth NTCr) is one of the first monographs to 
explore this question in depth – other discussions on the philosophical 
implications of cognitive science for theism can be found in edited 
volumes, such as The Believing Primate (edited by Jeffrey schloss and 
michael murray, 2009, ouP). Visala, who is a  theologian by training, 
focuses on the implications of Csr for Christian theism. The central aim 
of NTCr is to approach the rationality of theism in the light of Csr. 
Visala does not argue for the truth of (Christian) theism in the light of 
Csr, but rather, aims to ‘explore what consequences Csr would have 
for theism if both were true’ (p. 13). He argues that we need to make 
explicit the metaphysical assumptions (in particular physicalism, or in 
his terms, strict naturalism) that underlie Csr which make it difficult to 
evaluate the implications of Csr for theism. He outlines an alternative 
philosophical framework that he terms broad naturalism, under which 
the implications of Csr for theism may be more properly assessed.
The first two chapters of NTCr provide a comprehensive overview 
of Csr. As Visala acknowledges, it is not a  well-developed research 
program with unifying theories and assumptions, but rather, an emerging 
interdisciplinary endeavour, with roots in anthropology, cognitive 
psychology and developmental psychology. Within the field there are 
several  – sometimes mutually incompatible, mostly not integrated  – 
theories about why humans have religious beliefs. Visala devotes most 
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of his attention to what he calls the standard model of Csr, as developed 
by scott Atran, Pascal boyer, Justin barrett, and others, and he pits this 
program against other approaches to religion, such as the hermeneutic 
approach in anthropology. He notes that Csr has a physicalist ontology: 
Csr scholars hold that religious ideas, like other thought processes, can 
ultimately be reduced to brain states.
The standard model of Csr argues that religious beliefs arise and 
persist because of their fit with the structure of human cognition. most 
Csr scholars endorse some form of the modularity of mind thesis, 
which stipulates that human cognition is guided by specialized inference 
systems, including an ability to detect agents, intuitive psychology, 
intuitive biology and intuitive physics. religious ideas are culturally 
successful because they latch onto these specialized inference systems. 
First, they are minimally counterintuitive, i.e., they minimally violate the 
expectations we have about our physical, psychological and biological 
surroundings (e.g., a ghost violates intuitive physics by walking through 
walls). second, they are mainly about agents, which humans are prone 
to infer; humans possess a hyperactive agency detection device. We are 
prone to infer the presence of agents even if there is little evidence for 
their existence. moreover, supernatural agents have a rich mental life; we 
can attribute beliefs, desires and intentions to them, and we can make 
other inferences about them. some of the theoretical assumptions in Csr 
have not been subject to empirical testing. Visala briefly mentions that 
the hyperactive agency detection origin of religious beliefs, one of the 
central assumptions of Csr, is currently without substantial empirical 
support. This is clearly worrisome, for if the central theories of Csr 
have little empirical support, is the field mature and are its results secure 
enough to engage in discussions on whether or not Csr is compatible 
with theism?
Chapter 3 argues that research in Csr is driven by a strict naturalist 
program. strict naturalism is understood as a commitment to scientism 
(scientific enquiry has priority over all other enquiries), physicalism 
(all entities and processes are physical processes or reducible to 
physical processes; the physical realm is causally closed; higher-level 
states like consciousness are ultimately explicable in terms of physical 
states), and Darwinism as the primary framework for scientific and 
philosophical enquiry. This strict naturalism places severe constraints on 
the explanations that Csr scholars can invoke, as they can only accept 
178 booK reVIeWs AND NoTICes
physical causes. Visala concludes that strict naturalism, once accepted, 
necessarily leads to a methodologically atheistic science of religion.
In chapter 4, Visala outlines an alternative framework, broad natu-
ralism. broad naturalism does not subscribe to the causal closure of 
the physical domain; for instance, broad naturalists believe that mental 
states can have true causal power. As Visala acknowledges, this position 
is somewhat awkward, constantly ‘in danger of lapsing either into 
reductive materialism or some form of dualism or ontological pluralism’ 
(p. 114). This problem, however, can to some extent be avoided, if we 
understand broad naturalism simply as scientific practice that does not 
have a  strong commitment to reductionism and the causal closure of 
the physical. To flesh this position out in more detail, Visala relies on 
interventionist models in scientific explanation. strict naturalism fits well 
with causal-mechanical models in philosophy of science as it attempts to 
identify physical mechanisms to explain phenomena. by contrast, the 
interventionist approach establishes causes through intervention: if, by 
changing A we produce a change in b, we can posit a causal relationship 
between A  and b. In contrast to causal-mechanistic approaches, the 
interventionist approach does not require that one provide an account 
of a  chain of physical events to link cause and effect. Interventionism 
thus allows for non-physical explanations, such as personal-level 
explanations. For instance, one could explain why someone is a religious 
believer rather than an atheist in personal terms: ‘When we disconnect 
explanation from physical interaction [...] then in the case of John’s belief 
in God we can simply say that cognitive mechanisms do not give us what 
we want. Cognitive mechanisms surely are among the causes of John’s 
belief in God but they are not explanatorily relevant for our question 
(that is, why does John believe, rather than not believe, in God)’ (p. 150). 
Visala thinks that Csr explanations are relevant for explaining religious 
belief on a  population level, e.g., why afterlife beliefs are culturally 
widespread, but not on a  personal level, e.g., why John believes in an 
afterlife. Csr scholars would probably object to this distinction between 
personal and scientific explanations. Given that many of them follow 
Dan sperber’s epidemiology of representations, their aim is precisely 
to explain how religious beliefs get spread at the population-level by 
examining how individual minds (like John’s) understand and transmit 
religious beliefs – the cognitive mechanisms are therefore explanatorily 
relevant, even if they may not be explanatorily exhaustive.
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Visala does not think there is anything wrong with naturalism as 
a methodological position, but takes issue with the implicit ontological 
naturalism that underlies Csr. but once this metaphysical baggage is 
dropped, how should Csr scholars proceed? As most of the discussion 
in chapter 4 is not specifically centred on religion, but rather on the 
problem of mental causation, this question remains unanswered. The 
parallels between mental causation and religion (e.g., personal level 
explanation) do not warrant that a discussion on physicalism and Csr is 
entirely couched in terms of the problem of mental causation, as Visala 
does. There is more to religious belief and naturalism than the problem 
of mental causation.
Chapter 5 explores the implications of Csr for theism. Do Csr 
theories affect the rationality of theism negatively, positively, or are they 
neutral with respect to it? Visala observes that Csr scholars themselves 
are not in agreement about this, probably as a  function of their own 
religious beliefs (including atheism). He distinguishes three possible 
relationships between theism and Csr:
(1) The falsity of religion thesis: Csr theories are incompatible with 
the core worldview propositions of theism, and also negatively 
affect its auxiliary views.
(2) The religious relevance thesis: Csr theories are compatible 
with the core worldview propositions of theism, and are either 
positively or negatively relevant to its auxiliary propositions.
(3) The religious agnosticism thesis: Csr theories are compatible with 
the core worldview propositions of theism, and are not relevant to 
its auxiliary propositions.
Visala considers arguments in support of (1), and pays much attention 
to unreliability arguments, which hold that evolved inference systems do 
not reliably track objective truth. such arguments, however, are currently 
mainly directed against moral realism (see e.g., the anti-realist work of 
authors like sharon street and richard Joyce). Visala does not made 
explicit to what extent these debunking arguments against moral realism 
can be transferred to religious beliefs. Are the worries for moral realism 
and religious realism analogous? If not, where are the disanalogies? 
A discussion of these issues would have been welcome. For Csr, there 
seem to be few authors who explicitly endorse position (1), even among 
atheist writers. For instance, Daniel Dennett (Breaking the Spell, 2006: 25) 
wrote, ‘Notice that it could be true that God exists, that God is indeed the 
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intelligent, conscious loving creator of us all, and yet still religion itself 
[...] is a perfectly natural phenomenon.’ It seems that (1) remains difficult 
to maintain, as (at least in a logical sense) there is no incompatibility. For, 
in order to endorse (1) one would have to interpret the results of Csr in 
a strictly naturalistic sense, and (since this rules theism out by fiat) this 
would be question begging.
What of positions (2) and (3)? Visala thinks that (3), the position 
advocated by William James, goes too far. most of chapter 5 focuses 
on position (2) and asks whether Csr, even if compatible with theism, 
may perhaps lower (or alternatively, increase) the plausibility of theism. 
NTCr discusses two analogies, both by Peter Van Inwagen, that consider 
the relationship between theism and Csr, the bat urine analogy and the 
car heating analogy. each of these elicits quite different intuitions about 
whether or not theism is compatible with Csr. The bat urine analogy 
considers a weeping madonna statue in a church. After investigation, it 
is found that the tears are in fact bat urine, which drips onto the statue 
from bats that nestle on the church ceiling. A supernatural explanation 
is not logically incompatible with this observation – perhaps God made 
the bats nestle in that exact spot so that the statue would appear to be 
weeping. but this explanation is somehow not very compelling. Van 
Inwagen’s second analogy seems to elicit quite different intuitions. Here, 
we have a car that produces heat as a by-product of the functioning of 
its motor. Car designers use this by-product to produce effective car 
heating systems. In a similar vein, the standard model of Csr, according 
to which religion is a  by-product of cognitive capacities that are not 
specific to religion, such as agency detection, could in principle be 
incorporated into a larger theistic framework. God could have, through 
evolutionary processes, allowed belief in him to result as a by-product 
of normal cognitive systems. such positions have been defended, for 
instance, by Justin barrett and Kelly James Clark. They have argued that 
Csr actually offers empirical support for reformed epistemology, since 
it indicates that people have an untutored, spontaneous belief in God, 
similar to other non-self-evident beliefs like our belief in the existence of 
an external reality or the existence of other minds.
Visala discusses two difficulties for this reformed interpretation of 
Csr. He argues that if theistic belief is the result of purely naturalistic 
processes (even granting an ultimate theistic first cause), our religious 
experiences are ultimately not experiences of the divine. moreover, 
these evolutionary processes, described by Csr, only make it probable 
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that people acquire religious belief but not inevitable – reformed 
epistemologists may not like that God takes such risks. This latter 
problem does not strike me as a particular problem for the compatibility 
of Csr and theism, as it does not add anything new to the problem 
of divine hiddenness. The first worry Visala voices merits closer 
philosophical scrutiny and is also related to the problem of divine 
hiddenness: if religious experiences can indeed be explained as the 
result of natural processes, we are not experiencing God directly, but 
only think that we are. under this view, God is a  deceptor Deus, who 
fools us into experiencing him directly. I  suggest three responses the 
theist might offer. one would be to say that religious experiences are 
really experiences of God, albeit brought about through secondary 
causal processes – a Thomistic framework that regards natural processes 
as actions of God does not consider natural laws and divine action as 
competing explanations. Another is to argue that, since one does not 
need to accept the causal closure of the physical domain, it may be 
possible that some intense religious experiences are the result of a direct 
experience of God, even if our more everyday religious feelings (such as 
the intuition that God exists) are the result of purely secondary causes. 
under such a view, God does not deceive theists who, as a result of the 
structure of their cognitive architecture, believe that God exists; and he 
can still have more direct interventions on some occasions (e.g., mystical 
experiences). Thirdly, a theist could invoke overdetermination: natural 
causes may cause religious beliefs in conjunction with direct divine 
intervention, so religious experiences are both natural phenomena and 
supernaturally caused. These suggestions do not exhaust the design 
space of possible theistic responses. Visala raises, but does not answer, 
an important question: how can we conceptualize divine action with 
respect to religious belief and experience in the light of Csr?
NTCr is a  valuable addition in the ongoing discussions about the 
implications for theism of scientific approaches to religion. Visala has 
successfully demonstrated that the strict naturalism that underlies Csr 
makes it difficult to properly assess its implications for theism. The 
exploration of alternative philosophical conceptions of causation in 
chapter 4 provides an intriguing framework for more theist-friendly 
interpretations of Csr. However, I  would liked to have seen more 
explicit engagement with the empirical studies of religion, particularly in 
chapters 4 and 5. Whereas Visala demonstrates a thorough knowledge of 
the current state of the art in Csr in the first two chapters, there is hardly 
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any mention of specific Csr theories in the remainder of the book. His 
remains a high-level approach on the strict naturalistic assumptions of 
its researchers, which seems to me, given the disunity of the field, too 
sweeping an approach – a more fine-grained case-by-case examination 
would have been more appropriate. For one thing, as Visala points out, 
Csr scholars themselves do not agree on whether agnosticism, theism 
or atheism are the appropriate conclusions to draw from Csr research.
An unanswered question is, for instance, whether by-product accounts 
of religion and adaptationist accounts have different implications for 
the justification of religious beliefs. Adaptationist theories of religiosity 
are discussed in chapter 2; they are a  minority position in Csr but 
are gaining prominence. Adaptationist theories argue that religion is 
a cultural or biological adaptation that helps people to cooperate better. 
using such theories, one might go one step further than the car heating 
analogy by Van Inwagen and argue that God may have instilled religious 
belief in humans through a  theistic evolutionary process for a  double 
purpose: to have knowledge of him and to be able to live together more 
harmoniously. Another concern is that Visala seems to take a  causal, 
reliabilist account of truth for granted in his discussion of the justification 
of religious beliefs. but there are other models of justification (and 
indeed of knowledge) that do not depend on the existence of a proper 
causal link between the external world and beliefs, such as pragmatic or 
coherentist approaches. For instance, adaptationist theories of religion 
may provide a pragmatic model of justification. In this view, some people 
may be justified in believing in God because it confers various (fitness, 
social) benefits to them.
To conclude, NTCr blends philosophy of science, philosophy of 
cognitive science, and philosophy of religion in an engaging way. The 
scope of the book is impressive, and Visala’s expertise in these fields is 
evident. Due to the rather high-level discussion of naturalism, he leaves 
open the question of how specific theories in Csr can relate to theism. His 
conclusion that Csr may negatively affect arguments for the rationality 
of theism provides a new angle for discussions on divine hiddenness.
